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Societal perspective on access to publicly subsidised medicines: A cross 
sectional survey of 3080 adults in Australia 
 
  




Around the world government agencies responsible for the selection and reimbursement of 3 
prescribed medicines and other health technologies are considering how best to bring 4 
community preferences into their decision making. In particular, community views about 5 
the distribution or equity of funding across the population. These official committees and 6 
agencies often have access to the best available and latest evidence on clinical 7 
effectiveness, safety and cost from large clinical trials and population-based studies. All too 8 
often they do not have access to high quality evidence about community views. We 9 
therefore, conducted a large and representative population-based survey in Australia to 10 
determine what community members think about the factors that do and should influence 11 
government spending on prescribed medicines.   12 
Methods 13 
A choice-based survey was designed to elicit the importance of individual criteria when 14 
considering the equity of government spending on prescribed medicines. A representative 15 
sample of 3080 adult Australians completed the survey by allocating a hypothetical budget 16 
to different combinations of money spent on two patient populations.  Societal preferences 17 
were inferred from absolute majority responses i.e. populations with more than 50% of 18 
respondents’ allocation for a particular allocation criterion.  19 
Results 20 
This study shows that, all else being equal, severity of disease, diseases for which there is no 21 
alternative treatment available on the government formulary, diseases that affect patients 22 
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who are not financially well off, and life-style unrelated diseases are supported by the public 23 
as resource allocation criteria. Where ‘all else is not equal’, participants allocated more 24 
resources to the patient population that gained considerable improvement in health and 25 
fewer resources to those that gained little improvement in health. This result held under all 26 
scenarios except for ‘end-of-life treatments’.  27 
Responses to cost (and corresponding number of patients treated) trade-off scenarios 28 
indicated a significant reduction in the proportion of respondents choosing to divide 29 
resources equally and a shift in preference towards devoting resources to the population 30 
that were more costly to treat  for all criteria with the exception of severity of disease.  31 
Conclusions 32 
The general public have clear views on what’s fair in terms of government spending on 33 
prescribed medicines. In addition to supporting the application of the ‘rule of rescue’, 34 
important considerations for government spending included the severity of disease being 35 
treated, diseases for which there is no alternative treatment available on the government 36 
formulary, diseases that affect patients who are not financially well off and life-style 37 
unrelated diseases. This study shows that the general public are willing to share their views 38 
on what constitutes an equitable allocation of the government’s drug budget. The challenge 39 
remains to how best to consider those views alongside clinical and economic considerations. 40 
Introduction 41 
Since the 1940s, the Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme (PBS), Australia’s national formulary for 42 
publicly subsidised medicines, has endeavoured to provide all citizens and residents with 43 
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timely and equitable access to affordable, safe and effective medicines. While most PBS 44 
medicines are dispensed by community pharmacies and used by patients at home, some 45 
medicines are supplied through different distribution arrangements (Section 100 programs) 46 
e.g.  distribution from hospital outpatient departments [1, 2].    47 
The process for listing medicines on the PBS is underpinned by legislation that requires an 48 
independent expert committee, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC), to 49 
consider clinical effectiveness, safety and cost-effectiveness relative to existing therapies [3] 50 
prior to making a recommendation to the Minister of Health for listing a drug on the PBS.   51 
Evidence suggests that the PBAC has been broadly consistent in its use of economic 52 
efficiency as a key criterion for decision making. George et al [4], for example, analysed 53 
PBAC recommendations for the listing of drugs on the Australian PBS between 1991 and 54 
1996, and demonstrated that drugs with lower cost-effectiveness ratios had a higher chance 55 
of gaining a positive recommendation and subsidy. However, cost-effectiveness was not the 56 
only factor determining the PBAC’s recommendation. Other factors such as clinical need for 57 
the product and lack, or inadequacy, of alternative treatments also figured in the PBAC 58 
recommendations [4].  Harris et al [5] analysed PBAC recommendations between 1994 and 59 
2004 and demonstrated that clinical significance, cost effectiveness, cost to the government 60 
and severity of disease were all  significant influences on PBAC recommendations and 61 
concluded that there was no evidence of a fixed threshold for the value of a life year or a 62 
quality adjusted life year (QALY) [5].   63 
While such retrospective analyses are important, they do not tell us much about societal 64 
views on funding new medicines with respect to distributional equity. To answer this 65 
question, we need to take into consideration societal views on the selection and 66 
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reimbursement of prescribed medicines. One area that is particularly in need of societal 67 
input is that of high cost anti-cancer medicines given the rapid emergence of new, 68 
expensive and innovative medicines [6] as well as an increasing prevalence of cancer [7].  69 
 While there does not appear to be evidence that cancer patients are at a systematic 70 
disadvantage when it comes to PBAC recommendations [8], rejections of new anti-cancer 71 
medicines have been contentious, and often result in public indignation and organised 72 
campaigns to lobby for better drug access and coverage [9, 10]. This kind of dissent suggests 73 
that there remains a significant gap between policy makers and the public when it comes to 74 
assessments of the value of new anti-cancer drugs [11]. A recent Senate Inquiry conducted 75 
by the Australian government focused on examining timely access and affordability of anti-76 
cancer drugs, and how this impacts upon the quality of cancer care [12]. The resulting 77 
Senate Report concluded that the Government needs to undertake a “comprehensive 78 
review” of its processes for funding anti-cancer medicines, including considerations of  79 
“managed access” programs and “more flexible evidential requirements”. However the 80 
report had little to say about how to ensure that the system remains robust and  sustainable 81 
[12].  82 
Given the number of new high-cost anti-cancer drugs expected to be marketed in coming 83 
years, and limits to the amount of money that governments are willing to spend on 84 
medicines, reimbursement will continue to be a key challenge for decision makers in all 85 
healthcare systems [13, 14]. Bodies such as the PBAC will need to continually weigh up 86 
competing ethical, clinical, epistemic and economic considerations. One approach to 87 
assisting policymakers in striking the right balances and compromises  is to ask the public 88 
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who should have access to subsidised medicines and what decision characteristics (factors) 89 
should be considered when assessing overall societal value of a new medicine [15].   90 
Previous studies have elicited the general public’s preferences for access to publicly 91 
subsidised medicines. For example, a pilot study by Whitty and colleagues [16] found that 92 
the public (n= 161) and individual decision makers involved in the PBAC process (n=11) 93 
preferred to treat those with severe illness. More recently, Linley et al [17]  conducted a 94 
survey to elicit general public views about the criteria used by the National Institute of 95 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) for accepting higher incremental cost effectiveness ratios 96 
for some medicines over others, and about the introduction of the Cancer Drugs Fund (CDF) 97 
in England. Linley et al [17] showed that the general public supported trade-offs in equity 98 
and efficiency in the allocation of health care resources. However, it is not clear if UK 99 
societal preferences reflect preferences of the Australian public for pharmaceutical funding 100 
decisions. Further, studies have been undertaken among different stakeholder groups 101 
(including payers, government agencies, patients, healthcare professionals, academia  or the 102 
general public) in a different context based on a multi-attribute approach to identify criteria 103 
or factors that could influence healthcare resources allocation [18, 19]. Vogler et al [18] 104 
elicited preferences about policy objectives while the study by Tordrup et al [19] focussed 105 
on the policy options for future health system financing.  106 
The aim of this study was to explore preferences of the Australian public when it comes to 107 
government spending on medicines.  108 
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Methods 109 
Questionnaire design 110 
We conducted a survey of 3080 members of the Australian general public to identify criteria 111 
that are important to the public when assessing new medicines for PBS spending. The on-112 
line survey was based on a recent preference survey conducted by Linley et al in the UK [17] 113 
and adapted to issues relevant to the Australian PBS. Respondents were presented with two 114 
hypothetical patient groups and 12 different scenarios where the only difference between 115 
each scenario was a single criterion. Those criteria included: severity of disease, availability 116 
of an alternative treatment, innovation in drug mechanism, carer burden, disadvantaged 117 
populations (patients who are not financially well off), age (children), life expectancy, 118 
disease type (specifically cancer), prevalence of disease, cost, return to work benefits, life-119 
style related disease. A summary of the 12 allocation criteria and trade-off scenarios 120 
explored in this study are presented in Table 1. Each of the 12 allocation criteria is known to 121 
be considered by the Australian drug selection committee (PBAC) when making a 122 
recommendation for listing on the PBS or supported by the published literature as 123 
important criteria for resource allocation decisions [16, 17, 20-22]. 124 
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Table 1  Allocation criteria explored including cost and benefit trade-off scenarios 
Allocation criteria 
explored 
Baseline: All else being equal (equal 
treatment costs and effectiveness) 
Benefit trade-off scenario Cost trade-off scenario 
Severity of disease1 Should more PBS money go to patients with 
severe health problems (Pop 1) compared to 
those with moderate health problems (Pop 2)? 
 
Trade-off scenario explored smaller health 
gain for severe disease compared with 
moderate disease 
 
Trade-off scenario explored higher costs of 
treatment for severe disease compared with 
moderate disease  
Availability of 
alternative treatment 
option as proxy for 
unmet need1  
Should more PBS money go to patients for whom 
there are no alternative treatments available on 
the PBS (Pop 1) compared to those for whom 
there are several alternative treatments already 
available on the PBS (Pop 2)? 
 
Trade-off scenario explored smaller health 
gain for the disease with no alternative 
treatment available on the PBS compared 
with the  disease with several alternative 
treatments already available on the PBS 
 
Trade-off scenario explored higher costs of 
treatment for the disease with no alternative 
treatment available on the PBS  compared 
with the disease with several alternative 
treatments already available on the PBS 
 
Innovative medicines Should more PBS money go to treatments that 
work in new ways (Pop 1) compared to 
treatments that work the same way as existing 
treatments (Pop 2)? 
 
Trade-off scenario explored smaller health 
gain for medicine that has an innovative 
mechanism of action compared with 
medicine that works in the same way as 
other existing medicines 
 
Trade-off scenario explored higher costs of 
treatment for medicine that has an innovative 
mechanism of action compared with 
medicine that works in the same way as other 
existing medicines 
Care burden/wider 
societal benefit1  
Should more PBS money go to patients who have 
to rely on carers for their day-to-day needs (Pop 
1) compared to those who do not have to rely on 
carers (Pop 2)? 
 
Trade-off scenario explored smaller health 
gain for disease that causes patients to be 
dependent on carers (e.g. family members) 
for day-to- day needs compared with the 
disease that allows patients to remain 
independent   
 
Trade-off scenario explored higher costs of 
treatment for disease that causes patients to 
be dependent on carers (e.g. family 
members) for day-to- day needs compared 
with the disease that allows patients to 
remain independent   
Disadvantaged 
populations1   
Should more PBS money go to patients who are 
not financially well-off (Pop 1) compared to those 
who are financially well-off (Pop 2)? 
 
Trade-off scenario explored smaller health 
gain for disease that typically affects 
patients who are not financially well-off 
(e.g. patients from low income families) 
compared with the disease that typically 
affects patients who are financially well-off 
 
Trade-off scenario explored higher costs of 
treatment for disease that typically affects 
patients who are not financially well-off (e.g. 
patients from low income families) compared 
with the disease that typically affects patients 
who are financially well-off 
 
Children1  Should more PBS money go to treating children 
(Pop 1) compared to treating adults (Pop 2)? 
Trade-off scenario explored smaller health 
gain for children compared with adults 
Trade-off scenario explored higher costs of 
treatment for children compared with adults 




Baseline: All else being equal (equal 
treatment costs and effectiveness) 
Benefit trade-off scenario Cost trade-off scenario 
  
Life expectancy/end 
of life treatments1  
Should more PBS money go to patients who 
would die within 18 months without treatment 
(Pop 1) compared patients who would die within 
60 months without treatment (Pop 2)? 
 
Trade-off scenario explored smaller health 
gain (life extension of 3 months vs. 6 
months) for patients with a life expectancy 
of 18 months compared with 60 months 
without treatment  
 
Trade-off scenario explored higher costs of 
treatment for patients with a life expectancy 
of 18 months compared with 60 months 
without treatment 
Cancer treatments1  Should more PBS money go to patients who have 
cancer (Pop 1) compared to patients with a non-
cancer disease (Pop 2)? 
 
Trade-off scenario explored smaller health 
gain for patients with cancer compared with 
non-cancer disease 
 
Trade-off scenario explored higher costs of 
treatment for patients with cancer compared 
with non-cancer disease 
Rare disease 
therapies1 
Should more PBS money go to patients with rare 
diseases (Pop 1) compared to those with 
common diseases (Pop 2)? 
 
Trade-off scenario explored smaller health 
gain for patients with a rare disease 
compared with common disease 
 
Trade-off scenario explored higher costs of 
treatment for patients with a rare disease 
compared with common disease 
Cost to the PBS and 
savings to patients  
Should more PBS money go to patients whose 
out of pocket costs without PBS subsidy would be 
high (Pop 1) compared to those whose out of 
pocket costs would be low (Pop 2)? 
 
Trade-off scenario explored smaller health 
gain for patients with a disease that costs 
the PBS $5000/saves patients $4960 per 
month compared with the disease that 
costs the PBS $100/saves patients $60 per 
month 
 
Trade-off scenario explored higher costs of 
treatment for patients with a disease that 
costs the PBS $5000/saves patients $4960 per 
month compared with the disease that costs 
the PBS $100/saves patients $60 per month 
Medicines that help 
patients return to 
work  
Should more PBS money go to patients whose 
diseases affect their ability to work (Pop 1) 
compared to those who are able to continue 
working despite their disease (Pop 2)? 
 
Trade-off scenario explored smaller health 
gain for disease that impacts upon patients’ 
ability to work compared with disease that 
does not prevent patients from working 
without treatment  
 
Trade-off scenario explored higher costs of 
treatment for disease that impacts upon 
patients’ ability to work compared with 
disease that does not prevent patients from 
working without treatment 




Should more PBS money go to patients with a 
disease unrelated to lifestyle (Pop 1) compared 
to those with diseases that are related to lifestyle 
(Pop 2)? 
Trade-off scenario explored smaller health 
gain for disease that is unrelated to lifestyle 
compared with the disease that is lifestyle 
related 
 
Trade-off scenario explored higher costs of 
treatment for disease that is unrelated to 
lifestyle compared with the disease that is 
lifestyle related 
1 Criteria that were the same as those explored in the UK study by Linley et al.  
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Abbreviation: Pop= population
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The potential importance of each criterion was quantified by asking each respondent to 138 
allocate notional PBS money to combinations of 100 patients, those combinations 139 
representing more or fewer patients with a particular criterion (such as patients with severe 140 
vs. moderate disease). This was done for all 12 scenarios. For example, if the respondent 141 
allocated the PBS budget to 50 patients with moderate disease and 50 patients with severe 142 
disease (all else being equal), this indicates indifference to disease importance in the 143 
distribution of beneficiaries when allocating the PBS budget. An allocation of more than 50% 144 
to patients with severe disease would indicate a societal preference for distributing the drug 145 
budget to patients receiving treatment for severe disease i.e. societal preferences were 146 
inferred from absolute majority responses for a particular allocation criterion.  147 
The second part of study involved splitting the total respondent sample into two cohorts. 148 
Cohort 1 respondents were asked to complete an additional set of trade-offs where the 149 
estimate of benefit was varied for each of the two hypothetical patient groups (see S1). For 150 
cohort 2 respondents, the trade-offs varied according to the cost implications of each 151 
criterion (see S2). In this way the survey design was consistent with the Linley study [17] and 152 
minimised the burden on survey respondents.  153 
Figure 1 (Fig 1) presents the text introducing the 12 allocation criteria. Figure 2 (Fig 2) 154 
provides an example of the text of the prioritisation question using cancer treatments as the 155 
allocation criterion of interest.  156 
Fig 1. Text introducing the 12 allocation criteria 157 
Fig 2. Summary of the survey format using cancer as an example criterion 158 
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Socio-demographic data were collected to assess associations between respondents’ 159 
characteristics and views on the allocation criterion (see Table 2). 160 
Administration 161 
Participants and recruitment 162 
The target sample size of this study was informed by studies reported in the literature [17, 163 
23, 24] and available resources. The sample of 3080 participants (aged 18 years or older) 164 
was drawn from members of the Australian public enrolled on the panel of a market 165 
research company. A ‘minimum quota’ approach controlled by gender, age and 166 
geographical area (state of residence) was used to ensure that the sample was 167 
representative of the general adult Australian population. As described above, participants 168 
were divided into two cohorts exploring two different kinds of ‘trade-offs’. 169 
Pilot survey 170 
In August 2015, a pilot survey was conducted with 111 participants to test the logistics, flow 171 
and user friendliness of the survey. An additional question regarding the state of residence 172 
was added after pilot testing. Following completion of pilot testing, the full survey was 173 
administered during October 2015 and closed when our target of 3000 complete responses 174 
(i.e. 1500 per cohort) was achieved (by the end of the month).  175 
Ethics 176 
Ethical approval of the study was obtained from the ethics committee at Sydney University 177 
(protocol number: 2014/906). 178 
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Statistical analysis 179 
Descriptive statistics were used to summarize demographic variables. Responses to both 180 
parts of the survey (i.e. both the ‘all else being equal’ condition and the trade-off condition) 181 
were analyzed by classifying responses into three groups: (1) respondents favoring 182 
Population 1; (2) respondents favoring an equal allocation between the two competing 183 
populations; (3) respondents favoring Population 2. Societal preferences were inferred from 184 
absolute majority responses i.e. populations with more than 50% of respondents’ allocation 185 
for a particular allocation criterion. This was repeated for each of the 12 allocation criteria 186 
explored. Responses to Part 1 questions from cohorts 1 and 2 were pooled (as both cohorts 187 
were asked the same set of ‘all else being equal’ questions). Part 2 results (trade-off 188 
questions) were analyzed by cohort.  Shift in preferences was determined using each 189 
cohort’s preferences under the assumption of ‘all else being equal’ as a baseline. 190 
McNemar’s test was used to determine the statistical significance of any relative shifts in 191 
preferences between Parts 1 and 2 by cohort.  Exact conditional logistic regression was used 192 
to obtain odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals.   193 
Logistic regression modeling using gender, age, marital status, education status, health 194 
status, cancer history, country of birth, private health status, employment status, household 195 
income, dependent children and state of residence was conducted to determine their 196 
impact on respondents’ expressed baseline funding preferences on the 12 allocation criteria 197 
(i.e. under the assumption of ‘all else being equal’). Model fit was tested using the Hosmer 198 
and Lemeshow [25] goodness-of-fit test. All statistical analyses ware performed using 199 
version 9.4 of SAS. 200 




A total of 3080 adult members of the general public in Australia completed the on-line 203 
survey.  The second part of the survey – the benefit and cost trade-off scenarios – required 204 
splitting the sample into two equal sized cohorts. The characteristics of the respondents in 205 
each of the cohorts were almost identical (Table 2). 206 




n    % 
Cohort 2 
(N=1547) 
           n     % 
Combined 
(N= 3080) 





     
   
   Male  749 48.9 753 48.7 1502  48.8 48.9 
   Female  784 51.1  794 51.3 1578 51.2 51.1 
Age (years)    
 
    
   18-24  186 12.1  188 12.2 374 12.1 12.2 
   25-34  268 17.5  274 17.7 542 17.6 18.0 
   35-44  299 19.5  297 19.2 596 19.4 18.5 
   45-54  276 18.0  277 17.9 553 18.0 17.9 
   55-64  240 15.7  241 15.6 481 15.6 15.2 
   65+  264 17.2  270 17.5 534 17.3 18.2 
Marital status    
 
    
   Married/de facto  908 59.2  924 59.7 1832 59.5  
   Separated/divorced  156 10.2  152 9.8 308 10.0  
   Widowed  55 3.6  43 2.8 98 3.2  
   Never married  414 27.0  428 27.7 842 27.3  
Education    
 
    
Never attended school/ 
primary/ some high school   
211 13.8  220 14.2 431 14.0  
   Completed high school  318 20.7  309 20.0 627 20.4  
   University, TAFE etc.  998 65.1  1011 65.4 2009 65.2  
   Prefer not to answer  6 0.4  7 0.5 13 0.4  
Cancer history      
 
    
Cancer history with death1 597 38.9  578 37.4 1175 38.1  
Cancer history with no 
death/death unknown 
243 15.9  246 15.9 489 15.9  
No cancer history 673 43.9  703 45.4 1376 44.7  
Prefer not to answer 20 1.3  20 1.3 40 1.3  
General health    
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1 The variable ‘cancer history with death’ pertains to cancer related deaths in close family members of the 208 
survey respondents. 209 
   Very good  267 17.4  277 17.9 544 17.7  
   Good  750 48.9  731 47.3 1481 48.1  
   Average  408 26.6  434 28.1 842 27.3  
   Poor/ very poor  108 7.0  105 6.8 213 6.9  
Country of birth    
 
    
   Australia  1141 74.4  1144 73.9 2285 74.2  
   Overseas  392 25.6  403 26.1 795 25.8  
Private health insurance    
 
    
   Yes  896 58  918 59 1814 59  
   No  637 42  629 41 1266 41  
Employment status    
 
    
Working full time   546 35.6  536 34.6 1082 35.1  
Working part time  303 19.8  319 20.6 622 20.2  
Currently not working, but 
looking for work 
179 11.7  197 12.7 376 12.2  
Retired  327 21.3  342 22.1 669 21.7  
Other  178 11.6  153 9.9 331 10.7  
Household annual income    
 
    
  $0 to 20,000    120 7.8  129 8.3 249 8.1  
  $20,001- 40,000  310 20.2  300 19.4 610 19.8  
  $40,001 to 80,000  427 27.9  436 28.2 863 28.0  
  $80,001 to 180,000  436 28.4  438 28.3 874 28.4  
  $180,001 and over  65 4.2  69 4.5 134 4.4  
   Prefer not to answer  175 11.4  175 11.3 350 11.4  
Personal annual income    
 
    
   $0 to 20,000  380 24.8  374 24.2 754 24.5  
   $20,001- 40,000  364 23.7  347 22.4 711 23.1  
   $40,001 to 80,000  395 25.8  397 25.7 792 25.7  
   $80,001 to 180,000  203 13.2  219 14.2 422 13.7  
   $180,001 and over  23 1.5  24 1.6 47 1.5  
   Prefer not to answer 168 11.0  186 12.0 354 11.5  
Household composition    
 
    
With financially dependent 
children 
453 29.5  474 30.6 927 30.1  
Without financially 
dependent children 
1080 70.5  1073 69.4 2153 69.9  
State         
Australian Capital Territory 24 1.6  23 1.5 47 1.5 1.7 
New South Wales 496 32.4  489 31.6 985 32.0 32.2 
Northern Territory 3 0.2  7 0.5 10 0.3 0.9 
Queensland 292 19.0  295 19.1 587 19.1 19.9 
South Australia 117 7.6  119 7.7 236 7.7 7.6 
Tasmania 36 2.3  34 2.2 70 2.3 2.3 
Victoria 368 24.0  377 24.4 745 24.2 25.1 
Western Australia 142 9.3  147 9.5 289 9.4 10.4 
Unknown2 55 3.6  56 3.6 111 3.6 - 
 Page 16 
 
2 The pilot survey did not include this demographic question (n= 111). 210 
3 Australia demographics (gender, age and state of residence) are for persons aged 18 years and over, sourced 211 
from the TableBuilder available from the Australian Bureau of Statistics based on the 2011 Census data 212 
(http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/tablebuilder?opendocument&navpos=240). 213 
TableBuilder is an online self-help tool that enables users to create tables, graphs and maps of Census data. 214 
 
All respondents: Allocation preferences under the 215 
assumption of ‘all else being equal’  216 
Table 3 summarises respondents’ baseline (“all else being equal”) preferences for allocating 217 
PBS funds between two competing populations according to each of the 12 allocation 218 
criteria.  219 
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Choice Prioritise population 1  
N (percentage, 95% CI) 
Equal allocation to both 
populations  
N (percentage, 95% CI) 
Prioritise population 2  







Com All else being equal1  1624 (52.7, 51.0-54.5) 1286 (41.8, 40.0-43.5) 170 (5.5, 4.7-6.4) All else being equal1 Moderate 
disease 
 
1 Little health 
improvement 
392 (25.6, 23.4-27.8) 
OR= 0.14; p <0.001 
700 (45.7, 43.2-48.2) 
OR= 1.32; p= 0.004 
441 (28.8, 26.5-31.1) 
OR= 9.66; p <0.001 
improves health 
considerably 
2 Twice the cost of 
population 2 
751 (48.5, 46.0-51.1) 
OR= 0.70; p<0.001 
663 (42.9, 40.4-45.3)  
OR=1.07; p=0.52 
133 (8.6, 7.3-10.0) 
OR=2.49; p<0.001 











1 Little health 
improvement 
639 (41.7, 39.2-44.2) 
OR= 0.38; p <0.001 
594 (38.7, 36.3-41.2) 
OR= 1.25; p= 0.04 
300 (19.6, 17.6-21.7) 
OR= 3.20; p <0.001 
improves health 
considerably  
2 Twice the cost of 
population 2 
867 (56.0, 53.5-58.5) 
OR=1.26; p= 0.04 
519 (33.5, 31.2-36.0) 
OR= 0.73; p=0.007 
161 (10.4, 8.9-12.0) 
OR=1.10; p=0.57 
Half the cost of 
population 1  
Medicines 
work in a 
new way 
 
Com All else being equal 1  1213 (39.4, 37.7-41.1) 1523 (49.4, 47.7-51.2) 344 (11.2, 10.1-12.3) All else being equal1 Medicines 





1 Little health 
improvement 
477 (31.1, 28.8-33.5)  
OR= 0.51; p <0.001 
599 (39.1, 36.6-41.6) 
OR= 0.50; p <0.001 
457 (29.8, 27.5-32.2) 
OR= 5.71; p <0.001 
improves health 
considerably 
2 Twice the cost of 
population 2 
675 (43.6, 41.1-46.2) 
OR= 1.55; p < 0.001 
583 (37.7, 35.3-40.2) 
OR= 0.42; p < 0.001 
289 (18.7, 16.8-20.7) 
OR= 2.19; p <0.001 












1 Little health 
improvement 
483 (31.5, 29.2-33.9) 
OR= 0.45;p <0.001 
584 (38.1, 35.7-40.6) 
OR= 0.72; p= 0.003 
466 (30.4, 28.1-32.8) 
OR= 3.19; p <0.001 
improves health 
considerably 
2 Twice the cost of 
population 2 
673 (43.5, 41.0-46.0) 
OR= 1.72; p < 0.001 
591 (38.2, 35.8-40.7) 
OR= 0.53; p <0.001 
283 (18.3, 16.4-20.3) 
OR= 1.21; p= 0.19 
Half the cost of 
population 1 
Patients 




Com All else being equal1  1920 (62.3, 60.6-64.1) 931 (30.2, 28.6-31.9) 229 (7.4, 6.5-8.4) All else being equal1 Patients 




1 Little health 
improvement 
801 (52.3, 49.7-54.8) 
OR= 0.35; p <0.001 
558 (36.4); 34.0-38.9) 
OR= 2.02; p <0.001 
174 (11.4, 9.8-13.1) 
OR= 2.07; p <0.001 
improves health 
considerably 
2 Twice the cost of 
population 2 
995 (64.3, 61.9-66.7) 
OR= 1.30; p= 0.03 
420 (27.1, 25.0-29.4) 
OR= 0.67; p= 0.001 
132 (8.5, 7.2-10.0) 
OR= 1.22; p= 0.28 
Half the cost of 
population 1  
Children 
 
Com All else being equal1  1171 (38.0, 36.3-39.8) 1696 (55.1, 53.5-56.8) 213 (6.9, 6.0-7.9) All else being equal1 Adults 
 1 Little health 440 (28.7, 26.5-31.0) 748 (48.8, 46.3-51.3) 345 (22.5, 20.4-24.7) improves health 











Choice Prioritise population 1  
N (percentage, 95% CI) 
Equal allocation to both 
populations  
N (percentage, 95% CI) 
Prioritise population 2  




improvement OR= 0.44; p < 0.001 OR= 0.59; p <0.001 OR= 6.93; p <0.001 considerably 
2 Twice the cost of 
population 2 
808 (52.2, 49.7-54.8) 
OR= 3.45; p <0.001 
624 (40.3, 37.9-42.8) 
OR= 0.29; p <0.001 
115 (7.4, 6.2-8.9) 
OR= 0.97; p= 0.93 






(End of life) 
 





1 3 month survival gain 371 (24.2, 22.1-26.4) 
OR= 1.00; p= 1.00 
839 (54.7, 52.2-57.2) 
OR=  1.31; p= 0.01 
323 (21.1, 19.1-23.2) 
OR= 0.68; p= 0.003 
6 month survival gain 
2 Twice the cost of 
population 2 
604 (39.0, 36.6-41.5) 
OR= 3.73; p <0.001 
649 (42.0, 39.5-44.5) 
OR= 0.57; P < 0.001 
294 (19.0, 17.1-21.1) 
OR= 0.52; P <0.001 




Com All else being equal1  1049 (34.1, 32.4-35.8) 1773 (57.6, 55.8-59.3) 258 (8.4, 7.4-9.4) All else being equal1 Non-cancer 
disease 
 
1 Little health 
improvement 
426 (27.8, 25.6-30.1) 
OR= 0.58; p <0.001 
697 (45.5, 43.0-48.0) 
OR= 0.37; p <0.001 
410 (26.7, 24.5-29.0) 
OR= 8.05; p <0.001 
improves health 
considerably 
2 Twice the cost of 
population 2 
731 (47.3, 44.7-49.8) 
OR= 3.02; p <0.001 
651 (42.1, 39.6-44.6) 
OR= 0.32; p <0.001 
165 (10.7, 9.2-12.3) 
OR= 1.21; p= 0.29 




Com All else being equal1  800 (26.0, 24.4-27.6) 1311 (42.6, 40.8-44.3) 969 (31.5, 29.8-33.1) All else being equal1 Common 
disease 
 
1 Little health 
improvement 
345 (22.5, 20.4-24.7) 
OR= 0.67; p= 0.003 
574 (37.4, 35.0-39.9) 
OR= 0.74; p= 0.01 
614 (40.1, 37.6-42.6) 
OR= 2.10; p <0.001 
improves health 
considerably 
2 Twice the cost of 
population 2 
564 (36.5, 34.1-38.9) 
OR= 3.14; p <0.001 
603 (39.0, 36.5- 41.5) 
OR= 0.59; p <0.001 
380 (24.6, 22.4-26.8) 
OR= 0.54; p <0.001 















1 Little health 
improvement 
478 (31.2, 28.9-33.6) 
OR= 0.34; p <0.001 
578 (37.7, 35.3-40.2) 
OR= 0.70; p= 0.001 
477 (31.1, 28.8-33.5) 
OR= 5.00; p <0.001 
improves health 
considerably 






Com All else being equal1  1441 (46.8, 45.0-48.6) 1225 (39.8, 38.0-41.5) 414 (13.4, 12.3-14.7) All else being equal1 Patients 




1 Little health 
improvement 
566 (36.9, 34.5-39.4) 
OR= 0.42; p <0.001 
643 (41.9, 39.5-44.5) 
OR= 1.39; p= 0.002 
324 (21.1, 19.1-23.3) 
OR= 2.10; p <0.001 
improves health 
considerably 
2 Twice the cost of 
population 2 
779 (50.4, 47.8-52.9) 
OR= 1.54; p<0.001 
569 (36.8, 34.4-39.2) 
OR= 0.63; p <0.001 
199 (12.9, 11.2-14.6) 
OR= 1.06; p= 0.77 
Half the cost of 
population 1 











Choice Prioritise population 1  
N (percentage, 95% CI) 
Equal allocation to both 
populations  
N (percentage, 95% CI) 
Prioritise population 2  
















1 Little health 
improvement 
650 (42.4, 39.9-44.9) 
OR= 0.40; p <0.001 
641 (41.8, 39.3-44.3) 
OR= 1.34; p= 0.01 
242 (15.8, 14.0-17.7) 
OR= 2.51; p <0.001 
improves health 
considerably 
2 Twice the cost of 
population 2 
899 (58.1, 55.6-60.6) 
OR= 1.94; p <0.001 
502 (32.4, 30.1-34.9) 
OR= 0.51; p <0.001 
146 (9.4, 8.0-11.0) 
OR= 0.93; p= 0.74 
Half the cost of 
population 1 
1 Pooled results of cohorts 1 and 2 (n= 3080).  
Abbreviation: Com= combined cohorts 1 and 2 
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Allocation criteria considered more important than their alternatives 202 
(i.e. with more than 50% of respondents’ allocation)  203 
Of the allocation criteria explored, all else being equal, respondents expressed a preference 204 
(inferred from absolute majority responses) for allocating PBS money on medicines (1) 205 
treating severe diseases (as opposed to moderate diseases): 52.7%, (2) treating diseases for 206 
which there is no alternative treatment available on the PBS (compared to those where 207 
several alternative treatments are available): 53.6%, (3) treating diseases that affect 208 
patients who are not financially well off (as opposed to those that affect patients who are 209 
financially well off): 62.3% , and (4) treating life-style unrelated diseases (rather than life-210 
style related diseases): 51.7%.   211 
Allocation criteria considered equally important  212 
All else being equal, between 55.1 to 57.6% of respondents divided resources evenly on 213 
medicines treating: (1) diseases affecting children vs. adults (55.1%) and (2) cancer vs. non-214 
cancer (57.6%).  215 
Benefit and cost trade-off scenarios  216 
Table 3 summarises the effects of varying health gains (Cohort 1) and treatment costs 217 
(Cohort 2) on respondents’ allocation preferences for each of the 12 allocation criteria 218 
explored.   219 
Effect of varying health gains on respondents’ allocation preferences 220 
(benefit trade-off) 221 
A total of 1533 respondents (Cohort 1) completed the benefit trade-off scenarios for the 12 222 
allocation criteria explored. This group was asked to reassess their original allocations on 223 
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the assumption that one population would gain a small health improvement, while the 224 
other would gain a large health improvement.  225 
Removing the assumption of equal treatment effectiveness resulted in a statistically 226 
significant shift in respondents’ allocation preferences away from the population that 227 
gained a ‘little health improvement’ towards the population that gained a ‘considerable 228 
health improvement’ for all criteria with the exception of ‘end-of-life treatments’.  Results 229 
for the ‘end-of-life treatments’ criterion indicated a shift in respondents’ preferences away 230 
from the ‘considerable health improvement’ population to favouring an equal allocation 231 
between the two competing populations under the benefit trade-off condition.  However, 232 
the proportion of respondents favouring the population that gained a ‘little health 233 
improvement’ remained unchanged when compared to the ‘all else being equal’ assumption 234 
(24.2% vs. 24.2%, OR=1.00, p=1.00). 235 
Whilst there was an overall shift away from the ‘little’ to ‘considerable’ health improvement 236 
population, between 42.4 to 52.3% of respondents remained in favour of treating the 237 
former. This was despite the assumption that these patients would derive a little 238 
improvement in health compared with a considerable health improvement for the following 239 
allocation criteria: (1) treating diseases for which there is no alternative treatment available 240 
on the PBS instead of diseases for which several alternative treatments are available (47.1 241 
%), (2) treating diseases that affect patients who are not financially well off rather than the 242 
financially well off (52.3%), and (3) treating life-style unrelated diseases rather than the life-243 
style related diseases (42.4%). 244 
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Effect of varying treatment costs on respondents’ allocation 245 
preferences (cost trade-off) 246 
A total of 1547 respondents (Cohort 2) completed the cost trade-off scenarios for the 12 247 
allocation criteria explored. This group was asked to reassess their original allocations on 248 
the assumption that one population would be more costly to treat than the other. 249 
Therefore, the cost trade-off scenarios represent a trade-off in the total number of patients 250 
who could be treated. 251 
Responses to the cost trade-off scenarios (n= 1547) indicated a significant reduction in the 252 
proportion of respondents choosing to divide resources equally and a shift in preference 253 
towards allocating resources to the populations that were more costly to treat for all 254 
allocation criteria with the exception of severity of disease.  Despite the increased 255 
treatment costs and the resulting decreased number of total patients who can be treated 256 
with the available resources, 50% or more of the respondents expressed a preference for 257 
allocating greater amounts of PBS money on medicines (1) treating diseases for which there 258 
is no alternative treatment available on the PBS instead of diseases where several 259 
alternative treatments are available (56.0%), (2) treating diseases that affect patients who 260 
are not financially well off rather than those that affect patients who are financially well off 261 
(64.3%), (3) treating children instead of adult patients (52.2%), (4) treating patients whose 262 
diseases affect their ability to work as opposed to those who are able to work (50.4%), and 263 
(5) treating life-style unrelated diseases rather than diseases that are related to life-style 264 
related diseases (58.1%). 265 
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Relationship between respondents characteristics and 266 
allocation preferences 267 
Multivariable logistic regression for each of the 12 allocation criteria was conducted in order 268 
to investigate if there was a difference between allocation preferences (favouring 269 
population 1 versus equal allocation versus favouring population 2) under the assumption of 270 
‘all else being equal’, after adjusting for confounders. Results suggested that respondents’ 271 
preferences for allocation were influenced by their individual characteristics and 272 
circumstances. The results are summarised in Table 4.273 
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Table 4 Multivariate Analysis under assumption of equal treatment effectiveness and costs 
Explanatory 
variables 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































General health (self-reported) 


































































































Cancer History  
Cancer history 







































































































































































Country of birth 


































































































































































































Other 1.16  1.45  1.41  1.28  1.9  1.39  1.25  1.06  0.91  1.58  1.53  1.87 





























































(0.88-1.53) (1.10-1.92) (1.07-1.87) (0.97-1.7) (1.41-2.56) (1.04-1.85) (0.92-1.71) (0.80-1.41) (0.67-1.24) (1.20-2.08) (1.16-2.01) (1.42-2.48) 
Household income 












































































































































































































































































































SA 0.89  1.24  1.35  2.12  1.83  0.93  0.92  1.38  1.61  1.76  1.40  0.82  





























































(0.47-1.7) (0.65-2.36) (0.69-2.63) (1.04-4.32) (0.96-3.51) (0.48-1.82) (0.44-1.91) (0.68-2.78) (0.75-3.45) (0.89-3.49) (0.73-2.68) (0.43-1.56) 





































































































p= 0.56 p= 0.62 p= 0.72 p= 0.64 p= 0.41 p= 0.64 p= 0.03 p=0.51 p=0.67 p=0.66 p=0.09 p=0.67 
1 The variable ‘cancer history with death’ pertains to cancer related deaths in close family members of the survey respondents. 
Abbreviation: uni= university 
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Specifically, respondents with dependent children were significantly more likely to favour 272 
the funding for medicines for children (over adults), medicines for cancer diseases (over 273 
non-cancer diseases), and medicines for rare diseases (over common diseases) than those 274 
without children. Respondents who do not have private health insurance were significantly 275 
less likely to express a funding preference for treating patients whose diseases affect their 276 
ability to work (over those who are able to work despite their diseases) compared with 277 
those with private health insurance.  278 
Respondents with a household income higher than $20,000 per year were more likely to 279 
express a preference for prioritising treatment of severe diseases (compared to moderate 280 
disease), treating patients for whom there are no alternative treatments available on the 281 
PBS instead of diseases for which several alternative treatments are available. 282 
Respondents who are not in full time employment were more likely to favour treating 283 
patients who were not financially well-off (over those who are financially well-off patients), 284 
treating children (over adults), and treating life-style unrelated diseases (vs. life-style-285 
related diseases). In addition, respondents aged 25 years or older were less likely to 286 
prioritise medicines for severe diseases (vs. moderate diseases), medicines for children 287 
(over adult patients), medicines for rare diseases (vs. common diseases) and ‘end-of-life 288 
treatments’.    289 
In summary, all multivariate models satisfactorily fitted the data (p-value >0.05) except for 290 
‘end-of-life treatment’ (p= 0.03), but the deviation between the observed and predicted 291 
outcomes of the model was minor. 292 
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Discussion  293 
Consideration of public preferences is desirable when making decisions about the funding of 294 
medicines given that the general public are both the payers and beneficiaries of any publicly 295 
funded health technologies [16, 26]. There is, therefore,  an increasing recognition of the 296 
importance of taking into account public and patient preferences both in general and in 297 
relation to specific  funding decisions [11]. Understanding what patients and the general 298 
public value about new medicines can improve alignment between government and societal 299 
preferences.  This will, in turn, assist decision-makers to understand what societies are 300 
willing to support and forego in exchange for access to medicines [11].   301 
The selection and reimbursement of prescribed medicines is inherently challenging and at 302 
times ethically controversial given the legislated requirement to consider the safety, 303 
efficacy, cost effectiveness and standard of manufacture of new medicines. This must be 304 
done using an evidence-based’ framework. In that context, where and how do public 305 
preferences/opinions fit into the decision making process? In Australia, the PBAC is not 306 
obliged to accept community preferences or opinions. But in seeking those very views the 307 
decision makers have an obligation to consider them in light of their charter to meet desired 308 
social objectives for the prescribed medicine budget. Inevitably that involves trade-offs and 309 
choices when considering the distribution of benefits and potential harms and costs of a 310 
particular decision. The key issue is that the whole process is informed by the best available 311 
information – including public preferences – and that there is transparent process for 312 
making an informed decision.  313 
Under the assumption of ‘all else being equal’, this study suggests that severity of disease, 314 
diseases for which there is no alternative treatment available on the PBS (representing 315 
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unmet need), diseases that affect patients who are not financially well off and life-style 316 
unrelated diseases are supported by the public as resource allocation criteria.  317 
Further, contrary to some views [27-30] and somewhat surprising given the existence of 318 
“special funds” both in Australia and internationally for cancers and for rare diseases [31, 319 
32], this study suggests that anti-cancer medicines and rare disease therapies per se are not 320 
factors that strongly drive public funding priorities. In fact, a large proportion of 321 
respondents favoured equal allocation of PBS money between (1) medicines for cancer vs. 322 
non cancer diseases (57.6%), and (2) medicines for rare vs. common diseases (42.6%). 323 
Notwithstanding the above, many new and expensive anti-cancer drugs are intended for 324 
rare cancers that are severe, life-threatening and for which there is no alternative treatment 325 
available on the PBS. Therefore, the public might nonetheless be supportive of resources 326 
being allocated to them.   327 
When the assumption of treatment effectiveness or treatment costs are varied, it appears 328 
that allocation preferences are sensitive to both the health gains that may be realised and 329 
the number of patients who may benefit from a particular treatment. Under the health 330 
benefit trade-off condition, with the exception of ‘end-of-life treatment’, removing the 331 
assumption of equal treatment effectiveness generally led to a statistically significant shift in 332 
preferences towards the population that gained a considerable improvement in health and 333 
away from populations that gained a little improvement in health. Responses to cost (and 334 
corresponding number of patients treated) trade-off scenarios indicated a significant 335 
reduction in the proportion of respondents choosing to divide resources equally and a shift 336 
in preference towards devoting resources to the population that were more costly to treat 337 
for all criteria with the exception of severity of disease.  The shift in respondents’ 338 
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preferences to the populations that were more costly to treat may be driven by a reluctance 339 
to set priority based on cost, a concern with ensuring access to treatment based on need 340 
and/or a desire to not disadvantage patients with a high cost illness—even if this means that 341 
population health is not maximized [11, 17, 33, 34].  342 
Resonance with earlier studies 343 
In line with the results of previous studies of public values [16, 17, 35, 36], this study 344 
provides evidence that members of the general public give higher priority to medicines used 345 
for the treatment of severe illness and for those with no available alternative, while no 346 
compelling evidence for prioritising ‘end-of-life treatments’ was observed. In the absence of 347 
other differences in patient or disease characteristics, or treatment effectiveness or costs, 348 
49.7% of respondents divided resources evenly between ‘end-of-life therapies’ and ‘non 349 
end-of-life therapies’. However, previous studies suggested that the general public and 350 
patients with a life limiting illness expressed a preference/higher willingness to pay for 351 
treatments that could improve quality of life and value quality of care [20, 37, 38].  352 
Comparison with the UK study by Linley et al 2013 353 
Results for societal preferences for 8 of the 12 allocation criteria examined in this study 354 
were compared with the UK study by Linley et al [17]: (1) severity of disease, (2) availability 355 
of alternative medicine, (3) carer burden, (4) disadvantaged populations, (5) children, (6) 356 
‘end-of-life treatments’, (7) cancer diseases, (8) rare disease therapies. In summary, there 357 
was a striking level of consistency between the views and preferences on allocation criteria 358 
in the general public of the UK and Australia. 359 
Preferences under the assumption of ‘all else being equal’ 360 
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Two of the three criteria identified by the UK participants as valid National Health Service 361 
(NHS) resource prioritisation criteria were supported by the Australian respondents. Both 362 
studies suggest, all else being equal, that severity of disease and disease for which no other 363 
available treatments exist are supported by society as valid NHS/PBS resource allocation 364 
criteria (disease severity: 59.6% and 52.7%; no other medicine available: 56.5% and 53.6% of 365 
respondents from the UK and Australian studies, respectively). Respondents in this study 366 
also expressed a preference for treating diseases that affect patients who are not financially 367 
well off (i.e. the disadvantaged populations) while the UK public supported prioritisation of 368 
medicines that reduce reliance on informal carers.  369 
Preferences under health gain and cost trade-offs      370 
The UK study did not include a benefit trade-off question relating to carer burden.  371 
Therefore, results relating to the benefit trade-off conditions for seven of the eight 372 
allocation criteria were compared. Similar to the UK general public [17], participants in this 373 
study expressed a shift in preferences towards the populations that gained a ‘considerable 374 
improvement in health’ and away from the populations that gained a ‘little health 375 
improvement’ with the exception of ‘end-of-life treatments’ when faced with health gain 376 
trade-offs.  377 
Under the cost trade-off conditions, participants in this study and the UK study expressed a 378 
statistically significant shift in preferences towards the populations that were more costly to 379 
treat for all eight allocation criteria, with the exception of severity of disease.  380 
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Implications for policy making  381 
Implications for PBAC deliberations   382 
The factors that are taken into consideration by the PBAC, as described in the 2013 PBAC 383 
guidelines [21], include readily quantifiable factors such as comparative cost effectiveness, 384 
comparative health gain, patient affordability in the absence of PBS subsidy, financial 385 
implications for the PBS and the Australian Government health budget, as well as less 386 
quantifiable factors such as uncertainty,  equity, presence of effective alternatives, severity 387 
of medical condition treated, ability to target therapy with the proposed medicine precisely 388 
and effectively to patients likely to benefit most and development of resistance. Individual 389 
factors are not weighted equally by the PBAC in its decision making and the trade-offs 390 
involved in arriving at a recommendation, are not explicitly specified.  391 
This study provides evidence of societal support for two of the PBAC decision criteria:  392 
disease severity and lack of alternative therapy for the medical condition being treated.  393 
However, only 41% of respondents favoured prioritising patients whose out of pocket costs 394 
without PBS subsidy would be high compared to those whose out of pocket costs would be 395 
low.  396 
In summary, the findings of this study suggest that the views of the Australian community 397 
are aligned with the PBAC when it comes to prioritising medicines that target severe 398 
diseases and/or for diseases for which there is no alternative treatment available on the 399 
PBS. However, ‘patient affordability in the absence of PBS subsidy’ may not be a shared 400 
prioritisation criterion between the PBAC and the general public.   401 
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Opportunity cost 402 
The general public were less concerned about the opportunity cost of decisions (maximising 403 
population health), than they were about ensuring that resources are devoted to 404 
populations that are more costly to treat. This may be driven by concern for ensuring that 405 
patients whose diseases are expensive to treat are not disadvantaged, a desire to give all 406 
patients equal opportunity for access to treatment and/or a willingness to sacrifice health 407 
gains for a ‘fair’ public system over  a single minded focus on efficiency of maximising 408 
population health [11, 17, 33, 34]. Given that cost to the PBS and government is one of the 409 
key criteria used in public funding decision for new medicines, this difference may explain 410 
the observed conflict between public and policy makers’ priorities when medicines are 411 
denied funding apparently on the basis of cost-ineffectiveness alone.  412 
Rule of Rescue criteria  413 
The PBAC allows for consideration of ‘Rule of Rescue’ (RoR) criteria as part of its decision 414 
making process. A RoR applies  in exceptional circumstances for pharmaceuticals that 415 
provide a worthwhile benefit for a severe and rare condition for which there is no 416 
alternative treatment [15, 21].  For drugs that meet the RoR criteria, the PBAC could 417 
potentially reverse a decision not to recommend listing on the basis of comparative cost-418 
effectiveness (and any other relevant factors). This study explored three of the four criteria 419 
for PBS listing under the RoR, namely disease severity, lack of alternative treatment option 420 
and rarity of a disease [21]. Although disease severity and lack of alternative medicine for 421 
the medical condition were supported as allocation criteria by our participants, we observed 422 
no compelling evidence to support the rarity of disease criterion. In this study, only 26% of 423 
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respondents favoured prioritising patients with a rare disease in the absence of any other 424 
differences.      425 
Life Saving Drugs Program criteria 426 
Through its Life Saving Drugs Program (LSDP), the Australian Government provides 427 
subsidised access to expensive and life saving drugs that are not eligible for funding under 428 
the PBS, for very rare life-threatening conditions [32]. To receive LSDP funding, there are 429 
eight criteria that a drug must meet. This study explored three of the LSDP criteria: lack of 430 
alternative treatment options, rarity of a disease and affordability of the medicine.   431 
Although lack of alternative treatment option was supported in this study, the other two 432 
criteria (rarity of disease, patient affordability due to cost of the drugs) were not regarded 433 
as important in determining the distribution of subsidised PBS medicines by our 434 
respondents. This suggests that the use of rarity, and patient affordability as health 435 
technology assessment funding criteria for the LSDP appear to be open to question and 436 
require further scrutiny.   437 
It is worth noting that the LSDP is currently under review by the Australian Government. The 438 
review examines issues such as access and equity, value for money and the future 439 
administration of the programme [39]. The public consultation/submission process for the 440 
LSDP review was closed in 2015. However, there is no timeframe specified for the outcome 441 
of the review.   442 
Strength and limitations 443 
The strengths of this study were that it included a large, broadly representative sample (n= 444 
3080) of the Australian population. The format adopted for eliciting preferences of the 445 
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survey allowed an easy comparison of shift in preferences to provide a complete picture of 446 
respondent trade-off behaviours using either health gains or costs alone. The results of this 447 
study are consistent with other studies and notably a study by Linley et al [17], upon which 448 
this study was based.   449 
This study has limitations. The main limitation is that we simplified the survey task for 450 
participants by varying one allocation criterion at a time. We did not ask the public to 451 
consider multiple allocation criteria simultaneously, as the PBAC must do for any given 452 
submission. Whilst this study allowed for the rank ordering of relative importance of each 453 
allocation criterion, no conclusions can be made about any interaction effects among 454 
criteria. As such, it would be useful to capture these complexities in future research.  To 455 
minimise respondent burden and the number of criteria explored in this study, we also did 456 
not include all of the criteria considered by the PBAC for PBS and LSDP listing.  Due to the 457 
study design, details for non responders were not available for analysis or assessment for 458 
potential bias.   459 
Another potential limitation relates to framing bias. The questions in this study were framed 460 
to encourage expressions of societal preferences for the distribution of prescribed 461 
medicines. We did not seek individual’s views on direct questions of opportunity cost – a 462 
concept operationalised by the use of cost effectiveness information by the expert 463 
government committee. It is also possible that respondents’ own interpretations of the 464 
allocation scenarios have the potential to influence their expressed preferences.  465 
The results of this study suggest that respondent preferences may be influenced by their 466 
personal circumstances.  While some of these relationships have clear and plausible 467 
explanations, some are more difficult to explain. For example, relationship observed for 468 
 Page 38 
 
respondents without private health insurance and their expressed preferences for lifestyle 469 
unrelated diseases.  470 
Implications for future research 471 
Understanding and incorporation of public preferences and public engagement in public 472 
finding allocation for medicines is an important step towards ensuring the legitimacy, 473 
relevance and fairness of decision making and might reduce conflicts between public and 474 
payers regarding public funding allocation [11, 35, 40]. The results of this study give a clear 475 
picture of public preferences regarding medicines resource allocation and demonstrate that 476 
the general public are capable of giving opinions on distributional preferences. To enable 477 
effective integration of public and patient preferences into funding decisions, further 478 
research on defining a strategy to incorporate public perspectives into PBAC decision 479 
making processes is required.   480 
Conclusion 481 
Given that decisions about funding of new medicines have a direct impact on the general 482 
public through cost and access constraints [26], it is important that these decisions/decision 483 
making process take into account societal preferences and the community’s willingness to 484 
pay alongside the needs of the patients. Knowledge of public preferences and values allow 485 
policy makers to better understand the societal issues of importance and has the potential 486 
to reduce conflicts between public and payers regarding public funding allocation [11, 35, 487 
40]. 488 
Bodies such as the UK’s NICE and Australia’s PBAC have the expertise and resources to 489 
assess questions of comparative clinical benefit, cost, safety and quality of manufacture. 490 
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They are also well-placed to consider the opportunity cost of funding prescribed medicines. 491 
But it is the general public who are best placed to consider societal views on the fairness of 492 
those decisions. By any measure, almost all organised effort is expended in assessing the 493 
efficiency of funding decisions for prescribed medicines. Comparatively little effort is 494 
expended in considering the distributional consequences of expert committee 495 
recommendations. A person-centered approach to health care implies that we ask the 496 
public how they want spending decisions to reflect their preferences for the distribution of 497 
benefits and costs of prescribed medicines.  Therefore, if there is a commitment that public 498 
preferences matter, then it would be important for decision makers to consider and 499 
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